

# Japanese-Style STIX and TAXII Information Sharing Platform

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#### abstract.



In Japan, many organizations focus on CSIRT and CSIRT functions as cyber security countermeasure. Also many organizations promote to share the information for establishment of enterprise CSIRT, operate of CSIRT, threat intelligence and so on for cyber security countermeasure. However, in Japan, in order to disseminate information sharing of threat information by machine readable based security automation, we need to respond to requirements such as flow control of information traffic by the scale of CSIRT, group control of information traffic by the purpose, sector, severity and type, distribution control of threat and vulnerability information by same distribution channel and so on.


In this presentation, we will introduce construction situation of CSIRT and ISAC communities, information sharing trial using STIX/TAXII and the information sharing platform prototype for realizing the collaboration via systems and persons.

# opening.



In Japan, many organizations focus on CSIRT as Cyber security countermeasure. Many organizations promote to establish enterprise CSIRT.

As of December 1st 2017, Nippon CSIRT Association which is CSIRT community, has 267 member teams.




2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

# opening.



The characteristic of member teams classification is to great variety.

Automobile/motor Commercial





Also, some ISACs such as ICT-ISAC Japan, Financials ISAC Japan, JE-ISAC and Japan-Auto-ISAC started up. Nippon CSIRT Association introduced the following layered capability model for cyber security.

Tier 3: Cross domain capability for cyber security

Tier 2: Domain specific capability for cyber security

CSIRTS

Tier 1: Basic capability
for cyber security

# information sharing.




## objective

# Collaboration for the collective defense by measurement and indicators.

# information sharing.





# information sharing.



# collaboration via persons vs systems


 Collaboration via systems to match the speed of a threat actor's activities and to respond

	For an earthquake	For defensive measures against cyber attacks
Collaboration via systems (computer- based information sharing, machine- readable)	Fast reports on earthquakes, delivered by email	Systematization that uses STIX and TAXII etc.  STIX(Structured Threat Information expression) TAXII(Trusted Automated exchange of Indicator Information)
Collaboration via persons (human-based information sharing, human-readable)	News conferences by the Meteorological Agency	Collaboration using email, SNS and etc.



# layered measurement approach

 Layered measurement approach to understand the cyber security situation






# layered measurement approach

Layer	Measurement and migration	
Global	Global cyber health Indicators: Open proxy, Open Resolver, Open NTP and etc. =>Improvement of Internet Infrastructure Security	
Region/Nation Inter-ISAC	National cyber health Indicators: C2 server, Phishing Sites and etc. =>Eliminate general cyber threats in each of countries by each of countries.	
ISAC	cyber health of domain Indicators: Targeted email, Illegal remittance(Finance domain) and etc =>Eliminate domain specific cyber threats	



# countermeasure based approach

- Measurement and indicators for achieving cyber security measures
  - Ex. Number of C2 server indicators (sites/day)
     Number of Phishing Site indicators (sites/day)





# activities plan of experimental system

# **Current activities**

feed: C2

feed: VCITY

feed: BKMW\_CONF, BKMW\_ATTK, BKMW\_MANU

# **Next step activities**

STIX extension distributed C2 monitoring system



## countermeasure based approach


Process of measurement and indicators
 We would like to respond to requirements such as flow control of information traffic by the scale of organization, group control of information traffic by the purpose, sector, severity and type, distribution control of threat.

Preparation of <u>purpose</u> and <u>provider</u> based information feeds in feasibility study.



# countermeasure based approach

Process of measurement and indicators






## feed list: active

Туре	Feed Name	Overview
purpose based feed	Default	get all the feeds
	C2 (from Nov 2016)	C2 information (IP addresses, domains or URLs) detected by the dynamic analysis device in joined organizations.
	CY	Older data of Feed C2 (from Jan 2016 to Oct 2016)
	VCITY	C2 information (IP addresses, domains and URLs) extracted by the destination analysis system.
	BKMW_CONF	Configuration download site of Banking Malware
	BKMW_ATTK	Invocation (targeted) Banking URL and Manipulation sites of Banking Malware
	BKMW_MANU	Manipulation site of Banking Malware
	TEST	For test
provider based feed	N/A	



#### indicator counts of feeds


### Nov 30, 2016 - Nov 4, 2017





#### feed: C2


- C2 information detected by the dynamic analysis device in joined organizations.
  - From two organizations (ICT and Financial domains)
  - Provide C2 (URL, domain or IP address) as an indicator, and malware hash as additional information
  - Using STIX 1.1.1





#### feed: VCITY

- C2 information extracted by the destination analysis system.
  - From the destination analysis system
  - Provide C2 (URL, domain or IP address) as an indicator, and malware hash/activity check as additional information
  - Using STIX 1.1.1 and STIX extension





#### feed: VCITY

C2 information extracted by the destination analysis system.

Destination analysis system gathers activity check as related

information of indicator and shares it. **STIX** 192.168.1.1 ping 192.168.1.1 Hash nslookup 192.168.1.1 Upload malware GET http://192.168.1.1/ and etc. STIX extension Result of activity 192,168,1,1 Hash check éss Éxperimen purpose based feed Activity check Receive and Extract C2 from of C2 such as store uploaded uploaded nslookup, **VCITY** ping and port malware malware access.

destination analysis system

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
# feed: BKMW\_CONF, BKMW\_ATTK, BKMW\_MANU

- Banking Malware information for collaboration possibilities between ICT and Financial domain
  - From the Banking Malware observable system
  - Provide Configuration download site/Manipulation site/Malware hash as an indicator, and malware hash/invocation (targeted) Banking URL as additional information
  - Using STIX 1.1.1 and STIX extension



# feed: BKMW\_CONF, BKMW\_ATTK, BKMW\_MANU


 Banking Malware information for collaboration possibilities between ICT and Financial domain





feed: BKMW\_CONF, BKMW\_ATTK, BKMW\_MANU

 Banking Malware information for collaboration possibilities between ICT and Financial domain





# countermeasure based approach

- Construction of provider based feed (from public sector such as AIS) environment
- Preparation of operation guide for STIX in Japan
- Development and review STIX extension in Japan
  - Common template for inter-ISACs
  - Custom template for each ISAC
- Feasibility study of distributed C2 monitoring system using STIX/TAXII




#### STIX extension

Development and review STIX extension in Japan
We would like to respond to requirements such as
distribution control of threat and vulnerability
information by same distribution channel and so on.

Feasibility study of STIX extension to respond to requirements, if it is really necessary.



#### STIX extension





#### STIX extension for STIX 2.x

# Using custom object extensions

```
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--44af6c39-c09b-49c5-9de2-394224b04982",
"objects": [{
"type": "indicator",
                                                                                        STIX 2.x Object
"id": "indicator--d81f86b9-975b-bc0b-775e-810c5ad45a4f",
"created": "2014-06-29T13:49:37.079000Z",
"labels": ["malicious-activity"],
"name": "Malicious site hosting downloader",
"pattern": "[url:value = http://www.example.com/example.exe']",
"extensions": {
                                                   ISAC name
 "x-##-isac.jp": { ◀
  "monitoring": { ◄
                                                          Template name
    "input": " http://www.example.com/example.exe",
   "domain-name": ["www.test.co.jp", "example.co.jp"],
    "ipv4-addr": ["2.3.4.5", "12.13.14.15"],
                                                                                        Custom Object Extension
    "network-traffic": { "dst port": "80" },
                                                                                        for ##-ISAC Japan
   "ping-ext": { "lost": "0%" },
    "http-response-ext": { "status code": 200, "reason phrase": "OK" },
    "observe-time": "2017-09-04T10:31:37+00:00" },
  "process-time": { "system-name": "isac-monitor" },
  "id": "MM-20170904103137-08127-DSKOQ",
  "submit-time": "2017-09-06T04:53:03+09:00" } }
}]
```



#### STIX extension for STIX 1.x

# Tentative approachSTIX extension using "indicator:description"


```
<stix:STIX_Package>
 <stix:Indicators><stix:Indicator id="ICT-ISAC:indicator-01d88335-3c0a-43e5-9708-19d5fd70f916">
   <indicator:Title> C2 http://www.example.com/example.exe</indicator:Title>
   <indicator:Type xsi:type="stixVocabs:IndicatorTypeVocab-1.1">C2</indicator:Type>
   <indicator:Description>
                                                      ISAC name
{ "x-##-isac.jp": { ◆
    "monitoring": { ←
                                                             Template name
     "input": " http://www.example.com/example.exe", "domain-name": ["www.test.co.jp", "example.co.jp"],
     "ipv4-addr": ["2.3.4.5", "12.13.14.15"], "network-traffic": { "dst_port": "80" },
     "ping-ext": { "lost": "0%" }, "http-response-ext": { "status code": 200, "reason phrase": "OK" },
     "observe-time": "2017-09-04T10:31:37+00:00" }, "process-time": { "system-name": "isac-monitor" },
     "id": "MM-20170904103137-08127-DSKOQ", "submit-time": "2017-09-06T04:53:03+09:00" } }
   </indicator:Description>
   <indicator:Observable id="ICT-ISAC:observableURIObj-01d88335-3c0a-43e5-9708-19d5fd70f916">
    <cybox:Title>Domain Watchlist</cybox:Title>
    <cybox:Object id="ICT-ISAC:URIObj-01d88335-3c0a-43e5-9708-19d5fd70f916">
     <cybox:Properties xsi:type="URIObj:URIObjectType">
      <URIObj:Value>http://www.example.com/example.exe</URIObj:Value>
     </cybox:Properties>
    </cybox:Object>
   </indicator:Observable>
  </stix:Indicator></stix:Indicators>
</stix:STIX Package>
```

monitoring agent



# feasibility study of distributed C2 monitoring system


Security automation for the collective defense





# security automation for the collective defense

#### Process of measurement and indicators





### security automation for the collective defense

# Collaborate together to make our Internet secure.



# Japanese-Style STIX and TAXII Information Sharing Platform

#### **Acknowledgement**

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